Listed companies that successfully deceive investing public and issue false financial reports have been observed in the financial markets around the world. The consequences of this practice are devastating on the investing community as well as on the society as a whole. Sell-side security analysts, among other gatekeepers in the financial markets, have been criticized. They should examine financial data issued by listed companies to assure investing public about the reliability of published data. So, to understand how listed companies have succeeded in issuing fraudulent financial reports in the presence of gatekeepers such as sell-side analysts, a well-known fraud case was chosen, i.e. Enron Company.
Introduction
The latest accounting scandals at the turn of the 21st century, particularly scandals in the U.S. markets, have battered global financial markets. The scandals started with Enron Corp. in 2001, a prominent and influential case, which was then followed by other companies up to the present day (Kieso, Weygand, & Warfield, 2007; McClelland & Stanton, 2004; Palazzo & Rethel, 2008; Ribstein, 2002; Thapa & Brown, 2007; Zahn, Singh, & Singh, 2008) (Benson, 2009; Bullock, Guerrera, Jenkins, & Sender, 2010; Giroux, 2008; Rockness & Rockness, 2005; Solomon, Mollenkamp, McKay, & Weil, 2005; Thakurta, 2009) , with many of those companies ending up in bankruptcy status.
The accounting information of these companies, which covered multiple periods of time and was externally audited, showed a healthy financial position and impressive performance. Then weeks or months later, these companies collapsed, or in some cases, needed to restate their financial statements. Thus, the fair and true financial picture had not been portrayed in the issued financial reports. Also, the word scandal is used here because many related parties, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), external auditors and security analysts, who are concerned with financial reporting process and outcomes, had not raised their voices and warned the public in advance to take timely and appropriate actions before the revelations of manipulation surfaced and emerged.
Sell-Side Security Analysts
As one of the gatekeepers, sell-side security analysts play this role. Sell-side security analysts normally utilize data from different sources to evaluate the company they follow before issuing investment recommendations to buy, hold, or sell its shares and formulate projections such as earnings per share and target price. Those sources include financial and nonfinancial issued by companies, its employees, trade publications, customers, suppliers, and general macroeconomic data level (Lorenzo, 2006; Sirri, 2004) .
Further, Sell-side analysts are typically employed by brokerage firms, and most of these brokerage firms are investment banks (Newsome, 2005; Scianni, 2003) . In contrast to buy-side analysts who are typically employed by money management firms as mutual and hedge funds, and prepare research reports for their employers solely, sell-side analysts provide their research reports to their employers and their clients (Fogarty & Rogers, 2005) . Therefore, sell-side analysts should exert every effort to provide independent, professional, and honest opinion to their clients and to public who entrusted them. In other words they should act as their agent (Goshen & Parchomovsky, 2005) .
Hence, when fraud cases erupted, analysts among others have been severely criticized and blamed as the cases of Enron and WorldCom (Healy & Palepu, 2003; Ribstein, 2002; Sirri, 2004) . Even in many cases, sell-side analysts or their employers have been accused of intentionally, and contrary to their personal opinions, of hyping and touting intentionally stocks to land lucrative investing deals for their investing banking divisions and penalized hundreds of millions of dollars. In 2003, and based upon what so called the Global Settlement Agreement, ten major investment banking firms, as Leman Brothers, in the U.S. agreed to pay around $1.4 billion dollars of penalties and making structural reforms because of issuance of unreliable and incredible research reports by their analyst (Fuchita & Litan, 2006) . In 2003, Jack Grubman, who was working a well-known telecommunication analyst at Citigroup, agreed to pay a penalty of $15 million and barred permanently form working in the securities industry because he issued deceptive recommendations (McGeehan, 2003; Scianni, 2003) .
Research Issue
Fraudulent financial reporting is unethical and has serious and damaging consequences on the financial markets. Shareholders lose their investments in terms of millions of dollars when stock prices fall down because of the revelations concerning those fraud companies, confidence of investors in financial markets is also lost and thus seek alternative investments other than financial markets, and potential job losses (Braddock, 2006; Crest, 2002; Nicholson, 2007; Perino, 2002; Thapa & Brown, 2007) . Further, whatever actions are taken to punish those violate security laws by issuing misleading financial data is conceived too late as to the victims of the fraudulent reporting game.
So, there is a need to investigate thoroughly the fraudulent financial reporting phenomenon from different angles. One of these angles is to find out how sell-side security analysts process fraudulent financial reports and cope with fraud companies before the revelation of such sham practices. In other words, sell-side analysts as experts and information traders in the financial markets and who process financial and nonfinancial data to provide investment advice are linked to the financial numbers game, and thus it is warranty to study the fraudulent reporting from this side and find out how this group of gatekeepers digest fraudulent data during the fraud periods when evaluating such fraud company\ies.
Literature Review
Many studies in various periods have shown steadily that security analysts are utilizing accounting data in their reports, though the extent by which analysts used such data is different from study to study. Govindarajan (1980) , Rogers and Grant (1997) , and Abdolmohammadi et al.(2006) are examples of studies that have showed this utilization. Generally, those studies highlighted the utilization in terms of quantitative sense. For example, what used in those reports. Therefore, it can be inferred that sell-side security analysts are by and large utilizing accounting data issued by the companies they cover.
Concerning sell-side analysts and fraudulent financial reporting, some studies have shown that although analysts may signal implicitly that there are fraudulent reporting practices, yet they have not clearly stated that selected fraud companies are producing fraudulent financial reports. Other studies have shown that analysts failed to indicate that there are financial misstatements. For example, Dechow et al.(1996) and Cotter and Young (2004) have shown that the number of analysts who dropped coverage of fraud companies before the revelation of such practices may indicate that they might discover such practices but withhold to reveal them in clear terms and expressions. While, Griffin (2003) found that analysts have failed to uncover the misleading accounting data before it is become a public news.
Research Method
Since that there is a need to understand thoroughly how sell-side security analyst process and utilize fraudulent financial reports issued by fraud companies, qualitative content analysis guided by grounded theory approach, Corbin (1990, 1998) version have been employed by this study. This approach implies that major categories (high level theoretical abstractions) are not predetermined and derived from data collected through down-top mechanism of analysis. Down-top style implies that analysis and conceptualization starts from the raw data level to identify low level abstraction of concepts, then uplifting the conceptualization abstraction process from those initial concepts derived to arrive at major categories that reflect the data collected pertinent to the phenomenon under investigation (Gurd, 2008; Kelle, 2007) . Further, data collection and analysis are performed concurrently and directed by wh should be based on the outcomes of the analysis process, therefore theory evolves through interplay of data collection and data analysis (Mansourian, 2006; Parker & Roffey, 1997; Strauss & Corbin, 1998; Suddaby, 2006) . According to Strauss amd Corbin (1990 , 1998 , there are three types of coding; open, axial, and selective coding. Thus, by utilizing these coding types the researcher ends up with a theoretical model that can explain the phenomenon under investigation. However, In axial coding, there is a hot debate regarding the usage of what so of this model (Kanning, 2008; Legree, 2008; Mehmetoglu & Altinay, 2006; Perry, 2006) . This model consists of several components. These are mainly causal conditions, phenomenon, context, intervening conditions, strategies, and consequences. The major criticism to this paradigm is that grounded theory researcher should not force concepts or categories during the coding process to fit into a priori predetermined scheme thus significant concepts might be lost (Kelle, 2007) .
Fraud Case: Enron Corporation
Enron Corporation has been chosen for this study as a case study since it has committed fraudulent financial reporting as evidenced by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). According to those AAERs, The fraud period of Enron is -2001 (AAER No. 1617 , August 21, 2002 AAER No. 1820 , July 28, 2003 AAER No. 2056 , July 13, 2004 ) .
On December 2, 2001, Enron filed for Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and this filling was considered as the largest bankruptcy case in U.S. history up to that time and shocked the financial markets in the U.S. (Bealing & Baker, 2006; Grumet, 2002) . This shock, in addition to other fraud cases as WorldCom, has led to the enacting of a new law called Sarbanes-Oxley Act in July 2002 (Perino, 2002; Thapa & Brown, 2007) .
So, Enron as a fraud case was considered as a prominent and influential fraud case, and that is why it has been chosen for this research. Moreover, data available for this case is rich and comprehensive. As a result, intense theoretical model can be developed to explain how did sell-side security analysts process misleading accounting data issued by Enron during that long fraud period, i.e. 1997-2001.
Data Collection
The main source of data for this study was sellof Enron, i.e. 1997 Enron, i.e. -2001 . Those reports were downloaded from a database called Invetext Plus. Additionally, financial media as Wall Street Journal have been utilized to enrich and support the coding outcomes of those From Investext Plus database, it has been downloaded a total of 355 reports. 80 reports were excluded from the analysis, since they were credit rating reports, equity reports related to Enron subsidiaries as Enron Oil and types of reports as interviews transcripts with some of the Enron senior officers. This implies that a total of 255 sellside equity reports were left for analysis. The details these 255 reports are shown in table 1. Those AAERs can be accessed through the SEC web site: http://search.sec.gov/secgov/index.jsp#queryResultsTop
Coding results: Re-Reporting
One of the major categories developed through the analysis process was Re-reporting. The implication of this major category is that analysts were getting data, accounting as well as other types of data, and, largely just reiterating what has been said or written without due analysis or discussion. More specifically, they presented their analysis based upon the data provided by Enron without questioning or examining the data itself. Therefore, to some extent, the analysts covering Enron were working as journalists.
This behaviour indicates that analysts failed to show fraudulent reporting of Enron, in the sense that if have been written or presented by Enron.
This major category is supported by three subcategories, which are behaviours or actions that have supported or led to the generation of this major category. These subcategories are reporting results, various channels of contacts, and reliance of management. See figure 1 below. 
Reporting Results
During the analysis process, it was noticed that analysts utilised reported accounting information issued by Enron without questioning the reliability of such data itself. However, analysts publicly and widely acknowledged the fact that Enron lacked transparent accounting practices. The key disclosures in the 8K (filed prior the recent 10Q filing) were related to consolidation of three off-balance sheet transactions, which required restatement of financial reports from 1997 to 2001. Further, the filing also elaborated on the $1.2 reduction in shareholders equity that was announced during the 3rd quarter conference call. (p. 3) t the impact of these additional liabil can be seen, this conclusion emerged very late, since it surfaced after Enron filled form 8-K to restate its financial statements and not before. Add made no dramatic change of recommendation. t period, 1997 2001, analysts practiced a process of re-reporting Enron-issued statements, without due care or scepticism , which means that not only did analysts build their analysis on accounting numbers issued by Enron, a company with weak transparency, they have not questioned or examined the numbers themselves.
Various Channels of Contacts
Analysts have received different types of data from Enron, financial and non-financial. They have received iews, strategy, and evaluation. The data were obtained via conferences, and holding personnel meeting with management were identified as ch reports.
It can be said that generally analysts were observed as re-reporting, and to a great extent, re-affirming what had been said in those meetings and gatherings. This supports this subcategory being cited within this major category, re-reporting. Management mainly discussed the issues relating to the LJM transactions and other partnerships in which ENE has similar interests. The company also attempted to assure investors that no further charges were coming and that no other hidden transactions exist. (p. 4) lieve the market is most likely overreacting to the news of the last few days, we have concerns that the company may face additional writeaccounting information manipulations in previous periods. However, analysts have presented the above conclusion in a mild manner, given the context of the situation then, and no elaboration or further details were given regarding financial reporting was discerned by well known financial media, such as the Wall Street Journal (mentioned in the financial reporting (mentioned in the report as well, (p. 5)). However, in the same report, analysts re-reported the 16, Enron reported th In that third quarter, Enron has changed it earnings by $1.01 billion, which led to reported losses of $618 million $1.2 billion. Therefore, in their analysis, analysts focused and evaluated Enron on recurring earnings, not bottom line earnings that included those nonrecurring items.
Hence, analysts who authored the above reports can be viewed, because of the surrounding circumstances -reporting the already emerged and public issues and not uncovering hidden issues.
Reliance on Management
management was with and manner of general acceptance and they re-reported accordingly.
The critical point here is not the argument of whether it was correct or otherwise to re-report, but rather that analysts practiced this reporting with general approval. Based on this view, this subcategory was classified as part of the major category, re-reporting.
Prudential Securities Incorporated, who on April 15, 1997, re-reported an goal of 10-15% reported earnings growth, our expectations are at the low end that growth in non-regulated energy markets and growth in so-called network revenue and income must drive higher returns on inv A.G. Edwards, -reported:
Management stressed that it is a logistics company and not a trading company... For example, ENE might meet a sharp increase in the demand for electricity in Chicago by 1) buying wholesale electricity, 2) firing up a gas-fired peaking plant and taking gas out of storage, 3) exchanging coal for electricity, and 4) turning off a manufacturing operations for a Retail Energy customer. (p. 5)
Discussion of the Results and Formulation of Propositions
Security analysts are not reporters, in a sense that the reporter describes by and large what is happening. The analyst dives into a company, collects and analyses relevant data, quantitative or qualitative, public or nonpublic information, and comes out ancial or nonfinancial data.
-reported the accounting information released by Enron. They these numbers in their reports. Further, analysts performed financial analysis based upon that data without paying attention as to the extent of credibility of the accounting information they were utilising.
It was noticed that financial analysis utilised in the a share (diluted and basic), price/earnings ratio, book value per share, price/book value per share, cash flow per share, price/cash flow per share, debt to capitalization. Also, analysts made some comparisons either with previous the impact of rapid growth and debt to capitalization ratio on the quality of the reported accounting information.
The lack of analysis suggests that when analysts utilised or re-reported the financial data issued by Enron in their reports, either by pure presentation or financial analysis, it meant that they considered the data to be reliable, otherwise they should have given the financial data a different treatment in their reports.
If the information base, from which analysts perform financial analysis and calculate ratios is misleading, then it is natural to expect outcomes to be inaccurate and misleading. The impact of conducting analysis on inaccurate or misleading data is not only that the analysis and findings are useless, but it may also cause serious harm to recipients of such reports. In particular, in this situation the investing public can be affected more than -making investment decisions. In addition, they may have their own sources of data regarding the companies that are covered by sell side analysts (Fogarty & Rogers, 2005; Mikhail, Walther, & Willis, 2007) .
Even credit rating agencies, such as S&P and Moody, have fallen into the process of utilising misleading f 2001, based mainly on financial statements issued by Enron. Such financial statements were used to compute ratios creditworthiness (Haldeman Jr., 2006) . Nevertheless, this does not mean the analysts were victims of using manipulated accounting information of its financial data was as early as 2000 (Baker & Hayes, 2005; Higson, 2001; Kastantin, 2005; Reinstein & McMillan, 2004; Reinstein & Weirich, 2002) . Moreover, many models have been developed by researchers to detect potential manipulation of accounting information and could have been utilised by sell-side security analysts to examine the status of financial statements issued by Enron or any other company they follow (Beneish, 1999; Lee, Ingram, & Howard, 1999; Persons, 1995) . It could even be suggested that due to conflicts of interest, such models were deliberately not utilised. Therefore, sell-side analysts should exert sufficient attention or even scepticism as to the reliability of accounting information of Enron before conducting financial analysis and come out with opinions which partially relied on such analysis (King, 2002) . According to Fogarty and Rogers (2005, p. 341) Maybe that was why analysts, as experts and providers of investment recommendations, had been exposed to harsh criticisms and to new regulations since they utilised fraudulent accounting information, an extreme form of earnings management by Enron, for a long period, 1997 2001. The criticisms occurred because the analysts rereported fraudulent financial data issued by Enron without due diligence and reasonable care.
management in, Prudential Securities Incorporated, January and who without any scepticism or question.
However, this research did find some cases where analysts had formulated an evaluation different to those presented in Enron-led analyst conferences and shown a different point of view in the evaluation, against the general trend of analysts. This implies that some contrarian analysts, who challenged the dominant analyst attitudes, were observed during the analysis process. In general the majority of analysts not only re-reported what Enron was stating, but also, they developed their opinions upon those statements. As such, their opinions were lacking critical analysis and a sceptical attitude of the information mentioned in those meetings and conferences. Also, in some major events, analysts repeated w example, when chief executive officer (CEO) Jeffrey Skilling resigned on August 14, 2001 and claimed that his resignation was due to personal reasons, analysts repeated this justification in their reports. They just mentioned the Management was adamant that there are no hidden or undisclosed issues at Enron (such as other shoes to drop) tha earnings guidance (UBS Warburg, August 15, 2001, p. 1).
In the same report, UBS Warburg stated, Mr. Skilling was a core force in the evolution of Enron (and open markets) over the past decade and the recent turn of events can not all be placed on his watch. We wish him well and hope he enjoys the time and money he has worked hard to create (p. 1).
It seems that analysts, with their array of resources and corporate management connections, did not investigate this event and concurred with press, in this case the Wall Street Journal, as the story regarding the third quarter results released by Enron on (Bost, 2006; Marken, 2003; Sherman, 2002) . (Sherman, 2002) transactions and their links to senior officers of Enron were suspicious, this was a red flag warning. He then dug Thus, sell-side analysts apparently have failed to act as analysts, and acted as reporters who did not bother to check facts. Therefore, it is not surprisingly that they failed to show fraudulent financial reporting committed by Enron in the prolonged fraud period, 1997-2001. Therefore, based on the findings of this research and relevant literature, the following propositions are presented:
P1:
It is likely that sell-side security analysts, who failed to show fraudulent financial reporting, to re-report selectively from the filed financial data of the fraudulent company without questioning the financial data itself.
P2: It is likely that sell-side security analysts, who failed to show fraudulent financial reporting, to re-report corporate management releases of fraudulent financial information from media and conferences, without questioning the released information itself

Conclusions
Analysts failed to show that Enron issued misleading financial data since they re-reported what Enron had reported without due care and scepticism. This might raise ethical questions about their performance whether it was independent and objective or othe to conflict of interests argument. However, this needs further research.
Sellby adopting many measures. For example, analysts might be held liable for their opinions regarding companies they follow, thus they will be more careful when formulate and issue their reports. Analysts might be exposed to standards to guide their performance as the case with external auditors.
Limitations and Further Research
The above coding results generated from sellof 1997-2001, and for that reason, those results are confined to those reports of the Enron case. Nevertheless, they develop a more refined grounded theory regarding the process of how sell-side analysts utilise fraudulent accounting information.
The theoretical propositions developed in section ten, which offer tentative explanations regarding relationships between the failure to show fraudulent financial reporting of Enron and the re-reporting practice of sell-side analysts can also be the subject of further research and empirical testing.
